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STANDING STILL IN THE ROBERTS 
COURT 
Jonathan H. Adlert 
In 2007, The New York Times reported "limiting the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring or appeal lawsuits" had emerged as an early 
"theme" of the Roberts Court.1 The Wall Street Journal concurred, 
reporting "the biggest change under Chief Justice Roberts might not 
involve who wins on the merits" but "who gets through the 
courthouse door in the first place."2 Reviewing some of the Court's 
initial decisions, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky commented that "the 
effect of many of the Court's decisions was to close the courthouse 
doors."3 More colorfully, Professor Judith Resnick labeled the 
October 2006 term-the first full term since the confirmations of 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito-as 
'"the year they closed the courts. "'4 
It is admittedly too soon to reach any definitive conclusions about 
the Roberts Court. The current Justices have yet to sit together for 
four full terms. An early consensus is emerging nonetheless that one 
effect of the Roberts Court is to make it more difficult for prospective 
plaintiffs to have their day in federal court. 
t Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. This paper was prepared for the Case Western 
Reserve Law Review symposium on "Access to the Courts in the Roberts Era," January 30, 
2009. 
1 Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 2007, at AI. 
2 Jess Bravin, Court Under Roberts Limits Judicial Power; Conservative Shift Sets 
Hurdles for Litigants, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at AI. 
3 Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 437 (2007); 
see also Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court-What a Difference a Single 
Justice Can Make: The 2006-2007 Tenn of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHJITIER L. 
REv. 1, 5 (2007) (identifying "the Court's determination to close off access to courts" as a 
"theme" of the October 2006 Supreme Court term). 
4 Greenhouse, supra note 1 (quoting Professor Judith Resnik, Yale Law School). 
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In some areas the Roberts Court does appear to have reduced 
access to the courts, as the commentators claim. Through its first 
three terms the Court accepted arguments that federal law preempts 
state tort litigation almost unerringly.5 The Court interpreted relevant 
statutory provisions and statutes of limitations narrowly to preclude 
litigation6 and declined requests to authorize previously undiscovered 
causes of action.7 As Professor Gene Nichol observed, this is a court 
that interprets statutory limits on litigation strictly and is reluctant to 
recognize new implied rights of action or adopt new, broadened 
interpretations of statutory bases for suits against private fmns. 8 Yet 
the Court has not uniformly ruled against access to federal courts, 
having opened the door to climate change litigation9 and habeas 
claims by Guantanamo detainees. 10 
Those areas in which the Court has limited citizen access to courts 
have something in common: a statutory foundation. Where the Court 
has erected or enforced barriers to private litigants seeking access to 
federal courts, it has grounded its decisions in the relevant federal 
statutes. The decisions in these cases all turn on statutory language 
and legislative intent. 11 As a consequence, nearly any of these 
decisions could be readily overturned by legislative action-and some 
may well be. Among its first actions in 2009, Congress enacted 
legislation to overturn the Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. 12 that barred Lilly Ledbetter's pay discrimination 
claim. Additional legislation overturning other decisions limiting 
private litigation, including the Court's holding that federal law 
preempts state law tort claims against medical device manufacturers 
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 13 may follow. 14 
5 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 947,968 
(2008) ("Every preemption case decided so far by the Roberts Court has been decided in favor 
of finding preemption."). But see Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. 
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 
(2008) (rejecting claim that punitive damages for oil spill were preempted by federal Clean 
Water Act). 
6 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008); Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205 (2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Actof2009, Pub. L. No. lll-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
7 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
s Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
821 (2009). 
9 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
10 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
11 The claim here is not that all of these decisions were correctly decided, but rather that 
the respective holdings were all justified on statutory grounds. 
12 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
13 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
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Congress does not retain the same ability to modify the Court's 
holdings in all "access to justice"-type cases. Specifically, Congress 
has limited ability to second-guess judicial decisions concerning 
Article ill standing. In the standing context, judicial limits on the 
ability of private parties to bring suit are often a matter of 
constitutional law .15 While Congress retains some ability to alter the 
bounds of standing on the margin, this authority is limited because the 
Article ill standing requirement is, at its core, a constitutional rule. 
Congress may tinker on the edges, but it cannot confer standing on 
parties that fail to meet the underlying constitutional requirements in 
a given case. 
Because standing decisions are more insulated from legislative 
revision than other sorts of "access to justice" cases, focusing on the 
Roberts Court's approach to standing may allow us to refine our 
assessment of the Roberts Court. Specifically, it may illuminate 
whether the underlying "theme" of the Court's work in this area is 
limiting access to the federal courts, or something else. For example, 
if the Court construes statutory jurisdictional provisions quite 
narrowly, but does not alter constitutional bases for jurisdiction, the 
Court is less "shutting the courthouse door" than it is deferring to 
Congress's role as the judiciary's doorman. Insofar as the Court has 
not restricted Article ill standing, this suggests that the Court is less 
hostile to "access to the ·courts" than it is reluctant to define the 
contours of such access itself, leaving to Congress the job of defining 
and delimiting citizen rights to sue. 
This Arti~le offers a preliminary look at the standing jurisprudence 
of the Roberts Court. This is obviously a work in progress, as the 
Roberts Court presents an evolving subject of study. At this point, 
however, the Roberts Court has yet to tighten the requirements of 
Article ill standing. To the contrary, insofar as the Roberts Court has 
altered the law of standing, it has made it easier for at least some 
litigants to pursue their claims in federal court. The Court's decisions 
denying standing have largely reaffirmed prior holdings, warts and 
all. By comparison, some of the Court's decisions on standing, most 
14 See David Ingram, Democrats Take Aim at Supreme Court Decisions, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 
10, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432902339; David Ingram, 
Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard posting at Blog of the Legal Times, July 
23, 2009, http:l/legaltimes. typepad.comlblt/2009/07/specter -proposes-return-to-prior -pleading-
standard.html 
15 In some cases, particularly those involving prudential standing, the question of standing 
can tum on legislative enactments rather than constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (finding plaintiffs had standing under "zone of interests" prudential 
standing doctrine due to congressional authorization of suit by "any person"). 
---------------------------.. 
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notably Massachusetts v. EPA 16 and, to a lesser extent, Sprint 
Communications Co. v. APCC Seryices Inc., 11 have lowered the 
standing bar, perhaps quite significantly. Whatever else has transpired 
with regard to citizen "access to federal courts" in the first four years 
of the Roberts Court, standing for citizens to invoke the jurisdiction 
of federal courts remains in place. 
I. STANDING IN THE COURT 
The constitutional doctrine of standing seeks to determine whether 
an individual litigant has a sufficient stake in the outcome of a 
particular legal dispute so as to create a "case" or "controversy" 
subject to resolution by an Article ill court. As colorfully explained 
by then-Judge Antonin Scalia, the standing inquiry asks of the party 
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court "What's it to 
you?"ls 
The specific requirements of Article ill standing, as articulated by 
the Supreme Court, are quite familiar to any student of federal courts. 
As the Court explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 19 and has 
repeated many times since, 20 the "irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing" has three parts?1 First, the "plaintiff must have suffered 
an 'injury in fact,"' that is both "actual or imminent" and "concrete 
and particularized."22 Second, there must be a "causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of. ,m Third, there 
must be a sufficient likelihood that the "the injury will be 'redressed 
by a favorable decision. "'24 Whether or not these requirements derive 
from a proper interpretation of the text of Article ill, the requirement 
that a plaintiff have standing in order for there to be a question "of a 
Judiciary nature"25 that can be resolved in federal court is cemented 
into the foundation of federal constitutional law. While there remains 
16 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
n 128 s. Ct. 2S3l (2008). 
18 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983). 
19 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
20 See, e.g., NE Fla. Chap. of Associated Gen. Contractors of Amer. v. City of 
Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (restating the minimum requirements of Article ill 
standing articulated in Lujan); U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995) (same); Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (same); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 
102-03 (1998) (same); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt1 Svcs, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
180-81 (2000)(same). 
21 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
22 ld. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). 
25 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 ,at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) (discussion of how judicial power was limited to questions of a "Judiciary nature"). 
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a vibrant academic debate over the textual and historical provenance 
of the contemporary standing doctrine,26 the basic contours of Article 
III standing find near universal assent on the bench. 
While there is substantial agreement in the courts over the formal 
requirements of Article III standing-injury, causation and 
redressability-there is substantial disagreement over how these 
requirements should be applied. By most accounts Lujan adopted a 
particularly narrow and demanding view of standing's 
requirements-a "slash-and-bum expedition through the law of 
environmental standing" according to one justice.Z7 Subsequent 
decisions, such as Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 28 and Federal Election 
Commission v. Akini9 adopted more lenient standards, recognizing 
less substantial or concrete injuries than Lujan suggested would be 
required. As a consequence, the law of standing sees frequent 
doctrinal shifts that alter the legal terrain without altering the 
underlying fundamentals. 
There are several justifications for the standing requirement, such 
as the need to ensure sufficient adversity between the parties30 and 
vindicate individual rights?1 The Supreme Court's standing 
jurisprudence over the past several decades, however, has grounded 
the standing requirement in the separation of powers. As Justice 
26 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, 
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1009 (2002); 
James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, 
and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. I 
(2001); Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original 
Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1001 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992); Steven L. 
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 
(1988); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968). 
27 See, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
2s 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
29 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
3D See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the 
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHl. L. 
REV. 545 (2006) (stating Article ill's case or controversy requirement ensures adequate 
adversity between the parties). But see Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of 
Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 4647 (2001) (arguing ideological plaintiffs 
are likely to be sufficiently adverse to satisfy this concern); Scalia, supra note 18. 
31 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or 
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1979) (stating among the purposes of 
standing the proper representation of individuals and self-determination); see also Eugene 
Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1664 (2007) (stating standing 
"prevent[s] the inefficient disposition of constitutional entitlements" and enables individuals to 
determine the best use of their own rights). 
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Sandra Day O'Connor stated in Allen v. Wright,32 "the law of Art. ill 
standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of 
powers"33 -and this idea helps define the role of judiciary within the 
constitutional framework. 34 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to 
declare that "'[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's 
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional 
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or 
controversies. '"35 
Whether or not eighteenth and early nineteenth century jurists 
recognized an implicit standing requirement in Article ill, the roots of 
standing (and other contemporary justiciability doctrines) can be 
unearthed in the founding period. "The province of the court is, 
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals," Chief Justice John 
Marshall noted in Marbu1y v. Madison. 36 Such cases stand in contrast 
to those that are "political" in that "[t]hey respect the nation, not 
individual rights" and are entrusted to the elected branches.37 Where 
the rights of individuals are at stake, the judiciary is within its element 
and properly exercises the authority of judicial review, even if that 
means second-guessing or over-ruling the actions of a coordinate 
branch. Yet when individual rights are not at stake, constitutional 
questions are properly left to the political branches, each of which has 
an independent obligation to uphold and enforce the Constitution. 
Notably, this separation of powers justification was explicitly 
embraced by two of the current Justices-Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia-before their respective 
nominations to the Court.38 According to then-Judge Scalia, "the 
judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element" of 
the principle of separation of powers-a principle inherent in the 
structure of the Constitution itself.39 Failure to observe these 
principles risks the "overjudicialization of the processes of 
self-govemance."40 Then-private attorney John Roberts likewise 
observed some years later that the doctrine of standing was "designed 
32 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
33 ld. at 752. 
34 ld. at 750 (explaining how the "case or controversy" requirement "defines with respect 
to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is 
founded"). 
35 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). 
36 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
37 ld. at 166. 
38 See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article Ill Limits on Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1229 
(1993); Scalia, supra note 18. 
39 Scalia, supra note 18, at 881. 
40 ld. 
·>~*'!!' .. ·. J 
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to implement the Framers' concept of 'the proper-and properly 
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."'41 As Roberts 
then explained, "By properly contenting itself with the decision of 
actual cases or controversies at the instance of someone suffering 
distinct and palpable injury, the judiciary leaves for the political 
branches the generalized grievances that are their responsibility under 
the Constitution."42 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Roberts Court generally-and the 
Chief Justice in particular-appear to have a "unique interest in 
standing cases."43 As documented by Professors Lee Epstein, Andrew 
Martin, Kevin Quinn, and J e:ffrey Segal, the percentage of cases 
involving standing has been "far higher" than in prior courts.44 Over 
four percent of the 145 cases decided by the Roberts Court in its first 
two terms involved standing concerns. By comparison, during the 
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, the percentage of standing 
cases fluctuated between 0.5 and just over 2 percent of the total 
cases.
45 This apparent increase in standing cases is perhaps even more 
notable as the Roberts Court is hearing significantly fewer cases per 
term than its predecessors, particularly the Warren and Burger Courts. 
Since joining the Court, Chief Justice Roberts has written an 
opinion in all but three cases in which the Court addressed standing 
concerns with a signed opinion.46 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the 
opinion for the Court finding the plaintiffs had standing in Rumsfeld 
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 41 and Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.48 He addressed 
the standing of parents to challenge race-conscious school assignment 
plans in his plurality opinion in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,49 and wrote the Court's 
opinion denying taxpayer standing in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. 
Cuno.50 This is unlikely to be accidental-the Chief Justice assigns 
4
' Roberts, supra note 38, at 1220 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,750 (1984)). 
42 /d. at 1229. 
43 Lee Epstein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should 
Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULsA L. REv. 651, 663 (2008). 
44 /d. 
45 See id. 
46 The three cases were Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007), and Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). In a fourth case, Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 
(2007), the Court issued a per curiam opinion. 
47 547 u.s. 47 (2006). 
48 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008). 
49 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
so 547 U.S. 332 (2006). In this case, Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment. I d. at 354-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment). 
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opinion authors so long as he is on the prevailing side of a case. Chief 
Justice Roberts also wrote strongly worded dissents from the Court's 
conferral of Article ill standing in Massachusetts v. EPA 51 and Sprint 
Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.52 Standing is clearly an 
issue close to the Chief Justice's heart. 
As already noted, Chief Justice Roberts's interest in standing was 
clear before his confmnation to the Court. Though he rarely 
expressed public opinions about legal or political issues during his 
impressive career as an appellate litigator, he published a short article 
in the Duke Law Journal defending the Court's constriction of Article 
ill standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 53 Like Justice Scalia 
before him, Chief Justice. Roberts suggested that rigorous application 
of the "injury-in-fact" requirement keeps the courts within their 
appointed roles and safeguards the separation of powers. It is thus 
perhaps not surprising that standing has occupied such a large share 
of the Roberts Court's early docket-at least in comparison to 
previous Courts. 
II. STILL STANDING 
Whatever the consequences of the Roberts Court's decisions in 
other doctrinal areas for citizen "access to the courts," the net effect 
of its standing decisions has been to increase access, at least for some 
litigants in some sorts of cases. In most respects, however, the 
standing doctrine in the first few terms has stood still. Most standing 
decisions involve the relatively straightforward application of existing 
precedent. In two cases, however, the Court broadened standing to 
allow greater access to federal courts, even if only on the margins. 
Most of the Roberts Court's standing decisions have been 
unanimous, reflecting the uncontroversial-and doctrinally 
inconsequential-effects of these decisions. In Lance v. Coffman,54 
for instance, the Court held unanimously, in a brief per curiam 
opinion, that four Colorado voters lacked standing to press an 
Elections Clause55 challenge to a state constitutional provision 
limiting the frequency with which state officials may redraw 
5t 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
52 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008). 
53 See Roberts, supra note 38. 
54 549 U.S. 437 (2007). 
55 The "Elections Clause" provides that "The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to 
the Place of chusing Senators." U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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congressional districts.56 The voters' suit asserted the sort of 
"generalized grievance" long precluded from judicial review.57 As the 
Court explained, the voters' only asserted injury was Colorado's 
alleged failure to comply with the Elections Clause, and a claim that a 
government failed to follow the law-without more-is insufficient 
to satisfy Article Ill. "This injury is precisely the kind of 
undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of 
government that we have refused to countenance in the past," the 
Court explained.58 As a consequence, the claim was readily 
distinguishable from cases in which voters alleged more concrete 
harms to their interests, or in which private citizens sued as relators 
on behalf of the state. 59 
The Court's holding in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno60 that state 
taxpayers lacked Article Ill standing to challenge a state's award of 
preferential tax credits to a local manufacturer was only slightly more 
consequential. For decades the Court had held that federal taxpayers 
lack Article Ill standing to challenge federal spending "simply 
because they are taxpayers."61 As the Court explained in Frothingham 
v. Mellon62 in 1923, a taxpayer's interest in the federal treasury is 
indistinct, "minute and indeterminable," and "the effect upon future 
taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and 
uncertain" as to preclude the justiciability of taxpayer challenges to 
federal spending.63 For the same reason, Chief Justice Roberts 
explained, a federal taxpayer would lack standing to challenge a tax 
expenditure, such as a tax credit or exemption; "In either case, the 
alleged injury is based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal 
activity on public revenues, to which the taxpayer contributes."64 
In Cuno, the Court held the argument against federal taxpayer 
standing to challenge federal appropriations or tax expenditures 
"applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers."65 If state 
taxpayers are to challenge preferential tax policies in federal court, 
then they must assert some basis for standing beyond their status as 
taxpayers,66 whether they claim the tax provisions at issue violate the 
56 Lance, 549 U.S. at 441-42. 
57 I d. at 439-40 (citing Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) and Ex parte Levitt, 302 
U.S. 633 (1937)). 
58 I d. at 442. 
59 See id. 
60 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
61 Jd. at 343. 
62 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
63 I d. at 487. 
64 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344. 
65 Id. at 345. 
66 I d. at 346. 
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Dormant Commerce Clause or any other structural constitutional 
provision.67 While acknowledging the Court had created a limited 
exception for taxpayer standing to challenge legislative Establishment 
Clause violations in Flast v. Cohen,68 Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that the injury in such cases is not to the litigant's interest in the 
federal Treasury. Rather, "the injury alleged in Establishment Clause 
challenges to federal spending" is "the very extract[ion] and 
spen[ ding] of tax money in aid of religion alleged by the plaintiff. "69 
As a consequence, Flast provided no precedent for challenging 
preferential tax credits. Even Justice Ginsburg, who concurred 
separately to state her disagreement with some of the more restrictive 
standing precedents of the past thirty years, accepted the 
"nonjusticiability of Frothingham-type federal and state taxpayer 
suits in federal court."70 
Yet the Roberts Court is hardly of one mind concerning standing. 
Four cases in particular reveal sharp divisions among the Justices on 
the application of Article Ill standing's requirements. Massachusetts 
v. EPA,11 Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,12 Hein 
v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,13 and Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute14 were all 5-4 decisions. In two of these cases, 
Massachusetts and Sprint, the Court found Article Ill standing; in the 
other two it did not. The breakdown among the Justices remained 
consistent across these cases, with the Court's four most liberal 
Justices consistently voting to approve standing claims and the four 
most conservative Justices consistently in opposition. Only Justice 
Anthony Kennedy was in the Court's majority in all four cases, 
sometimes writing separately to qualify his position.75 Here, as in 
other areas, Justice Kennedy is the median Justice whose views 
determine the outcome in close cases.76 
67 See id. at 348. 
6s 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
69 Cuno, 54 7 U.S. at 348 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Id. at 355 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
71 549 u.s. 497 (2007). 
n 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008). 
73 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). 
74 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
75 This demonstrates the frequency with which Justice Kennedy has cast the deciding vote 
in Article III standing cases. 
76 See Lee Epstein & Tanya Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REv. 37, 67 (2008) 
(describing Justice Kennedy as a "super median" justice). Justice Kennedy's ability to determine 
case outcomes has led some to call the Roberts Court the "Kennedy Court." See Chemerinsky, 
supra note 5, at 953-55 (describing Justice Kennedy's powerful influence as a member of the 
majority in 5-4 and 5-3 decisions since 2006); cf Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court 
Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 983, 1008-11 (2008) (stating that the 
idea of a "Kennedy Court" is not a new concept). 
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The most consequential standing case of the Roberts Court thus far 
is Massachusetts v. EPA.71 Indeed, Massachusetts is among the most 
consequential cases decided by the Roberts Court on any issue. 
Massachusetts loosened the requirements for Article III standing to 
challenge federal regulatory actions, both fm state litigants and others 
seeking to allege agency failure to comply with relevant statutory 
requirements. More than any other, this case altered preexisting 
standing doctrine, and did so in favor of those seeking to invoke the 
jurisdiction of federal courts. 
At issue in Massachusetts were whether the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") had the authority to regulate carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases as "pollutants" under the Clean 
Air Act and, if so, whether the EPA had properly declined to exercise 
such authority in rejecting a rulemaking petition submitted by several 
states and environmentalist groups. Massachusetts and the other 
petitioners sought to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from new motor vehicles under Section 202 of the Act so 
as to mitigate the threat of global_.warrning. Yet before it could 
approve the petitioners' claims, the Court had to first assure itself that 
at least one had Article III standing. 
Climate change presents an interesting standing challenge. The 
Court has long held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear 
"generalized grievance[s]" that are "'common to all members of the 
public. "'78 Thus, an Article III court lacks the jurisdiction to hear a 
naked claim that a government agency has failed to violate some 
provision of the law or, as noted above, that some portion of the 
federal Treasury was appropriated for an illegal purpose. Invoking the 
power of federal courts requires something more. In particular, it 
requires something that connects the allegedly wrongful act to a 
distinct harm suffered by the litigant. 
At first blush, the general bar on hearing "generalized grievances" 
would seem to preclude hearing a claim predicated on an injury 
derived from a gradual warming of the Earth's atmosphere. By 
definition, global climate change is a global phenomenon. The 
emission of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles in the United 
States or anywhere else contributes to global atmospheric 
77 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Wanning Up to Climate Change 
Litigation, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 63 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf; Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate 
Policy No Less Than Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildennuth, 
102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 32 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/ 
lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20/LRColl2007n20Adler.pdf. 
78 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 
U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)). 
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concentrations of greenhouse gases that, in tum, have an effect on the 
global climate. The alleged harms from any resulting global warming 
would be visited upon the globe, a conclusion that would seem to 
preclude the existence of a "case or controversy" fit for judicial 
resolution under Article ID.79 Much like an individual taxpayer could 
not claim a judicially cognizable injury from the misuse of funds in 
the federal Treasury, an individual citizen of the planet could not 
claim a judicially cognizable injury from a slight alteration of the 
planetary thermostat. At the very least, a prospective plaintiff would 
have to identify an actual or imminent harm to a specific legally-
protected interest resulting from such changes. Such attribution is 
very difficult. This is not to deny or disparage the potential 
consequences from climate change, but only to recognize the 
difficulty of finding a distinct, particularized .injury resulting from 
global environmental phenomena. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to establish the 
requisite injury by focusing the Court's attention on a specific 
potential consequence of global warming: sea-level rise. 80 
Massachusetts submitted affidavits asserting that anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases, by contributing to global warming, 
increase the threat of global sea-level rise that would flood some 
portion of Massachusetts's coast. 81 These affidavits noted that a 
modest rise in sea-level had occurred over the course of the twentieth 
century-albeit some of which was due to natural causes-and 
estimated the future sea-level rise that could result if anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases continue unabated. 82 
The focus on sea-level rise simplified the Court's inquiry, but it 
did not make the standing concern go away. An "injury-in-fact" must 
be both actual or imminent and concrete and particularized. 83 Therein 
lied a potential rub. Demonstrating that the injury from climate 
change satisfied one prong of this standard would necessarily make it 
more difficult to satisfy the other. Insofar as anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases have already warmed the atmosphere, it is 
exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to identify specific 
environmental changes that have occurred as a result of the human 
contribution to climatic warming with any degree of certainty. 
Identifying specific harms that will (or are at least quite likely to) 
79 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ('The very concept of 
global warming seems inconsistent with [the] particularization requirement."). 
80 !d. at 522. 
81 !d. at 521-22 (summarizing affidavits). 
82 !d .. 
83 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
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occur in specific places requires a resort to computer models that seek 
to project likely impacts from the human contribution to global 
warming in the decades ahead. So the injury is made concrete and 
particularized at the expense of its imminence. Again, this is not to 
deny the existence of anthropogenic global warming, but only to 
recognize that climate scientists have not yet been able to 
attribute specific environmental phenomena in specific places to 
human contributions to global warming, and this complicates efforts 
to demonstrate Article ill standing. 
In order to show that its injury was concrete and particularized, 
Massachusetts focused on sea-level rise, as the loss of state sovereign 
territory would certainly be a tangible harm of the sort Article ill 
demands. Yet as already suggested, the problem for Massachusetts 
was that in order to identify a specific loss of its own land from 
human-induced global warming with any particularity, it was forced 
to rely upon model projections far into the future. Specifically, 
Massachusetts focused on the potential loss of coastline due to 
sea-level rise "by 2100."84 Focusing on this sort of future injury 
enabled Massachusetts to identify a specific harm particular to it, but 
at the expense of its ability to claim any such harm was occurring 
here and now, and was thus "actual or imminent" as the Court's 
interpretation of Article ill requires. Under the pre-existing case law, 
assertion of a future injury would not suffice. Yet had Massachusetts 
focused on the effects of greenhouse gas emissions already underway, 
it would have been forced to assert injury from a modest change in 
global atmospheric temperature, and little else.85 Doing so would 
have meant abandoning any claim that the injury Massachusetts 
suffered was concrete and particular to its interests as a state. 
While purporting to adhere to the traditional test for standing 
articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 86 the Court took two 
steps to ease Massachusetts's legal burden, each of which constitutes 
a potentially significant change in the law of standing. 87 First, and 
most conspicuously, the Court declared that it was "of considerable 
84 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 n.20 (discussing "possible" effects of rising sea 
levels over the next century). 
85 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the best estimate 
for sea-level rise attributable to the human contribution to global warming is 3.5-Scm over the 
entire twentieth century. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 665 (J.T. Houghton et a!. eds., 2001), available at 
http://www .grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/climate/ipcc_tar/wg 1 /426.htm#fig 1110. 
86 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
87 It is certainly possible that the Court could have found that Massachusetts had standing 
within the traditional confines of the injury-in-fact requirement, perhaps by relying on the sheer 
enormity of the threat posed by global climate change, but this is not the course that the Court 
opted to take. 
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relevance" that the petitioner was "a sovereign State and not, as it was 
in Lujan, a private individual."88 This was relevant because "[s]tates 
are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal 
jurisdiction."89 Having ceded a portion of their sovereign authority to 
the federal government, the Court announced, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and other states were entitled to "special solicitude" 
when seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts.90 With this 
newfound solicitude "in mind," the Court had little difficulty 
concluding that a miniscule increase in sea-level rise satisfied the 
injury-in-fact requirement.91 
The majority purported to justify its newfound "special solicitude" 
for states in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,92 a century-old case_ in 
which the state of Georgia brought a federal common law nuisance 
suit against a polluting factory from across the border in Tennessee.93 
This case had nothing to do with standing, however. Rather, it was a 
suit under the federal common law of interstate nuisance-a suit of 
the sort that would almost certainly be preempted today under the 
Clean Air Act.94 The only "special solicitude" shown to Georgia in 
88 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
89 Id. at 518. 
9o Id. at 520. 
9
' The majority grounded Massachusetts's injury in the claim that "global sea levels rose 
somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming." 
Id. at522. 
The "unchallenged" affidavit the opinion cites for this proposition is more circumspect, 
however, claiming only that anthropogenic warming caused "major" contributions to this 
observed sea-level rise. See MacCracken Dec!. '![5(c), J. App. at 225, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 
497 (No. 05-1120). 
The IPCC, which purports to represent the scientific consensus on global climate change, 
attributes a minority of observed sea-level rise to human activities and has largely refrained 
from attributing specific amounts of sea-level rise in specific places to anthropogenic climate 
forcing. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 85, at 665; 
see also Posting of Roger Pielke, Jr. to Prometheus Blog, A Few Comments on 
Massachusetts v. EPA, http:// sciencepolicy .colorado.edu/prometheus/archi ves/c limate _change/ 
001160a_few_comments_on_ep.htrnl (Apr. 2, 2007). 
In any event, the amount of sea-level rise that constitutes Massachusetts's actual, present 
injury is less than O.lcm-0.2cm per year, and the amount of projected sea-level rise that could 
be redressed by regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under Section 
202 is even less, as U.S. motor vehicles only represent a fraction of GHG emissions. 
92 206 u.s. 230 (1907). 
93 Id. at 236. 
94 See City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1981) (holding that the Clean 
Water Act preempts interstate nuisance claims for water pollution under federal common law); 
see also Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law 
of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REv. 717,768 n.476 (2004) ("Although the Supreme Court 
has not directly addressed the question of whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts federal 
common law in disputes over transboundary air pollution, it is widely assumed to do so, 
particularly in light of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a comprehensive 
federal permit scheme similar to that established by the Clean Water Act."). But see Connecticut 
v. Arner. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009) (rejecting claim that Clean Air Act 
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the case was the Court's willingness to consider providing Georgia 
with equitable relief of the sort unavailable to private parties under 
federal common law due to the state's "quasi-sovereign" interest in its 
territory. 95 Yet it is one thing to hold that one state cannot foul the air 
of its neighbor and that state parties can pursue extraordinary 
equitable relief in federal court. It is quite another to maintain that a 
state's ability to vindicate such a claim on behalf of its citizens gives 
rise to a "special solicitude" when a state sues in federal court to 
invoke the regulatory apparatus of administrative agencies. 
On any fair reading, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper provides little, 
if any, support to the majority's newfound doctrine of "special 
solicitude." This may explain why the case was not cited in 
Massachusetts's briefs. Indeed, the case was not cited in any brief 
filed by any party or amicus in the case.96 While one brief filed by 
state amici did argue that states have special interests that should be 
taken into consideration as part of the standing analysis, it focused on 
the potential for federal law to preempt state regulatory initiatives.97 
preempts suit alleging greenhouse gases contribute to public nuisance of global wamring). 
95 Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237. 
96 The first appearance of the case came during oral argument, when it was raised by 
Justice Kennedy: 
ruSTICE KENNEDY: What's your authority for that? I have the same 
question as the Chief Justice. I was looking at your brief for the strongest case. 
Suppose there were a big landowner that owned lots of coastline. Would be have the 
same standing that you do or do you have some special standing as a State, and if so 
what is the case which would demonstrate that? 
MR. Mll..KEY: Well, Your Honor, first of all, we agree that a large 
landowner would himself or herself have-
msTICE SCALIA: Or even a small landowner? 
ruSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. I'm asking whether or not you have some 
special-
MR. Mll..KEY: Yes-
JUSTICE KENNEDY:-standing as a State and, if so, what the authority for 
that is? 
MR. Mll..KEY: Your Honor, first of all, I do think we have special standing. 
For example, here it's uncontested that greenhouse gases are going to make ozone 
problems worse, which makes it harder for us to comply with our existing Clean Air 
Act responsibilities. 
And the-in the West Virginia case, which is a D.C. Circuit case, the Court 
found that that itself provided an independent source of standing. In terms of 
Supreme Court cases, the-it's been-for 200 years, this Court has recognized loss 
of State sovereign property as a traditional-
ruSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I don't know. 1907 was Georgia versus 
Tennessee Copper, and that was pre-Massachusetts versus Mellon. That seems to me 
your best case. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-ll20). 
97 See Brief of the States of Arizona et a!. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15-
25, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1l20), 2006 WL 2563380. For a critique of these 
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Even those who believe states should receive such consideration 
recognize the Court's reasoning on this point was quite confused.98 
Recognizing a "special solicitude" for sovereign states was the 
Massachusetts Court's first revision to the law of standing. Its 
expansion of what constitutes a "procedural right" that would justify 
relaxing the traditional standing requirements of causation and 
redressability was the second. According to the Court, it was "of 
critical importance" that Congress had "authorized this type of 
challenge to EPA action. "99 As the Court had noted in Lujan, the 
"normal standards for redressability and immediacy" are relaxed 
when a statute vests a litigant with "procedural rights." 100 This is 
because, as Justice Kennedy explained in Lujan, "'Congress has the 
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. "' 101 
However, as the Massachusetts Court noted (again citing Justice 
Kennedy's Lujan concmrence), "'In exercising this power ... 
Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate 
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. "'102 
Therefore, the Court could relax the "normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy" so long as Congress identified the 
injury it sought to vindicate and the related the injury to those entitled 
to bring suit. Yet Congress never did anything of the kind. 
The only congressional enactment cited by the Court as a 
justification for easing standing's traditional redressability and 
immediacy requirements was Section 307(b)(l) of the Clean Air Act. 
Here, according to the Court, is where Congress had "authorized this 
type of challenge to EPA action." This was an innovative reading of 
the Clean Air Act. Up until Massachusetts, Section 307(b)(l) had 
been recognized as little more than a jurisdictional provision, 
identifying which petitions for review of EPA action under the Clean 
Air Act must be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
alternative arguments for state standing, see Brief of the Cato Institute and Law Professors 
Jonathan H. Adler, James L. Huffman, and Andrew P. Morriss as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 14-17, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3043962. 
98 See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA-
Breaking New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY I, 8 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/17 
ILRColl2007nl7Watts.pdf (noting "confusion" about the nature of Massachusetts's sovereign 
interest in the case). 
99 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). 
1°0 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,572 n.7 (1992). 
101 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
102 ld. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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Circuit as opposed to regional circuit courts of appeals.103 By its 
terms, this provision does not create a new procedural right, let alone 
"identify" an injury and "relate the injury to the class of persons 
entitled to bring suit."104 The underlying right to review agency action 
is found in the Administrative Procedure Act, not Section 307 of the 
Clean Air Act.105 Indeed, the Clean Air Act contains a citizen suit 
provision of its own that is virtually identical in every meaningful 
respect to the Endangered Species Act .provision found not to create 
such a right in Lujan.106 
In Lujan, the Court held that the Endangered Species Act's 
conferral of the right of "'any person ... to enjoin"' any federal 
agency "'alleged to be in violation"' of the Act was insufficient to 
create a procedural right, the violation of which would satisfy the 
requirements of standing.107 Such a provision, Justice Kennedy 
explained, "does not of its own force establish that there is an injury 
in 'any person' by virtue of any 'violation."'108 Yet if this is so, it is 
hard to conceive how a jurisdictional provision such as Section 307, 
which by its own terms does not impose any obligations on the EPA 
nor confer any express rights, does anything more to establish the 
existence of a judicially-cognizable injury. If the Court is to be taken 
at its word, Massachusetts effects a remarkable shift in administrative 
law by greatly expanding the class of statutes that should now be 
recognized as the source of procedural rights that justify loosening the 
causation and redressability requirements for standing.109 
Having found a justification for loosening the causation and 
redressability requirements, the Court had little problem concluding 
that these requirements had been met. While citing the longstanding 
rule that a favorable decision must "'relieve a discrete injury"' to the 
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (2000) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[a] petition for 
review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary 
ambient air quality standard ... or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or 
final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."). 
104 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)); see Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA- The Inconvenient Truth About 
Precedent, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 75, 79-80 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf. 
105 See Cass, supra note 104, at 80. 
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). This provision was not at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
107 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
1540(g)(l)(A)) (ellipsis in original). 
10Bid. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l)(A)). 
109 It is also possible that this portion of the Court's holding will be abandoned in 
subsequent cases. The Supreme Court is often criticized for its erratic application of 
administrative law principles. See generally Robert A Anthony, The Supreme Court and the 
APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1996). 
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plaintiff, the majority held that any government action that, all else 
equal, reduces (or at least retards the growth of) global emissions of 
greenhouse gases by any amount will suffice to redress some portion 
of the warming-induced injury. 110 After all, Justice John Paul Stevens 
explained, "A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace 
of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere."111 
And this, in turn, would have some effect on future projections of 
sea-level rise-even if only by less than one inch between now and 
2100. Under this loosened standard, any contribution of any size to a 
cognizable injury would be sufficient for causation, and any step, no 
matter how small, is sufficient to provide the necessary redress. 
The Massachusetts majority's expansive approach to standing 
prompted a strongly worded dissent from Chief Justice Roberts. 112 
While accepting that "[g]lobal warming may be a 'crisis,' even 'the 
most pressing environmental problem of our time,'"113 the Chief 
Justice concluded that such global environmental concerns were not 
amenable to resolution in federal courts. The Chief Justice 
accused the majority of abandoning ')udicial self-restraint" and 
adopting an "utterly manipulable" approach to the Article ill standing 
requirements in its effort to prop open the courthouse doors for 
climate change plaintiffs. 114 Massachusetts, in his view, resurrected 
the "high-water mark of diluted standing requirements, United States 
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)," a 
case that stretched the bounds of Article ill. 115 Massachusetts, 
Roberts intoned "is SCRAP for a new generation."116 
The Court may appear to have taken a slight step back from 
Massachusetts' permissive approach to standing in Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute, 117 decided shortly after this Symposium was held. 
Here, a 5-4 Court rejected environmentalist groups' efforts to 
challenge revised procedures the U.S. Forest Service adopted to 
110 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,525 (2007) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228, 244 n.l5 (1982)) (emphasis added). 
11
' Id. at 526. 
''
2 See id. at 535-49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
113 I d. at 535 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, 26, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 
497 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 558353). 
114 Id. at 548. This "effort" appears to have been successful insofar as federal appellate 
courts have found private plaintiffs to have had standing in subsequent climate change cases. 
See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009) (state and 
private plaintiffs have standing for alleged harms from climate change); Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (same), reh'g en bane granted, 2010 WL 685796 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 26, 2010). But see Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2009) 
(rejecting standing). 
115 I d. at 547. 
116 Id. at 548. 
117 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
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streamline timber removal on small parcels affected by forest frres. 118 
Specifically, the Court held that environmentalist plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge revisions to U.S. Forest Service regulations 
governing relatively small frre-rehabilitation and timber-salvage 
projects absent an injury tied to the application of these rules to a 
specific project. While this was an unwelcome decision for 
environmentalist groups, it was neither much of a surprise nor a 
significant change in the law of standing. 
Summers arose when several environmentalist groups filed suit 
against the U.S. Forest Service for failing to provide adequate notice 
and comment for a timber salvage sale, the Burnt Ridge project, 
covering 238 acres of fire-damaged timber in the Sequioa National 
Forest. 119 According to the Forest Service, salvage projects of this sort 
were exempt from the otherwise applicable statutory notice and 
comment requirements. 120 The environmentalist groups countered that 
this exclusion was illegal, and sought a nationwide injunction to 
prevent the Forest Service from exempting any such projects from its 
procedural rules. 
The environmentalist groups unquestionably had standing to file 
their initial suit. They were challenging the Forest Service's actions 
with regard to a specific project at a location frequently used by at 
least one of their members.121 Yet standing to challenge federal 
agency rules as applied to a specific project does not confer standing 
to challenge the same agency's rules in the abstract-and that is 
where the plaintiffs' problems emerged. 
The environmentalist plaintiffs quickly prevailed in their initial 
suit. They obtained a district court injunction against the Burnt Ridge 
project, prompting the federal government to settle the case. 122 At this 
point, according to the District Court, the Burnt Ridge project was no 
longer an issue in the case, 123 and yet the environmentalist groups 
sought to press their claims against the Forest Service's policy of 
excluding small timber salvage projects from the otherwise applicable 
procedural rules. 
IIBJd. at 1147,115). 
119 I d. at 1147-48. 
120 I d. at 1147; see also 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a), 215.12(f) (providing that procedural 
requirements would not apply to forest projects categorically excluded from requirement of 
producing either an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment under the 
National Environmental Policy Act). 
121 Id. at 1149 (describing affidavits). 
122 See Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F.Supp.2d 994 (E.D.Cal. 2005); Summers, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1148. 
123 Earth Island lnst., 376 F.Supp.2d at 999. 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that the 
plaintiffs no longer had standing to challenge the Forest Service's 
policy once they had settled their claims concerning the application of 
the policy to the Burnt Ridge project. This was the only specific 
project the plaintiffs had ever identified for which the application of 
the Forest Service policy would cause them a judicially cognizable 
injury. 124 Without the prospect of an injury resulting from the Burnt 
Ridge sale, plaintiffs could no longer claim standing to challenge "the 
regulation in the abstract," as they could no longer identify "any 
concrete application that threatens imminent harm to [their] 
interests."125 Although Congress sought to provide prospective 
plaintiffs with a procedural right to file comments on proposed 
projects, plaintiffs did not have standing to vindicate such rights 
because they were unable to identify "some concrete interest that is 
affected by the deprivation." 126 
Writing in dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer did not challenge the 
majority's application of the traditional standing requirements so 
much as he sought to explain why a more permissive test should 
apply. So, for example, Justice Breyer "concede[d] that the Court 
sometimes used the word 'imminent"' when enumerating the 
constitutional requirements of Article ill standing, but argued that this 
should be understood only to preclude standing for '"conjectural' or 
'hypothetical' or otherwise speculative" harms. 127 If any alleged harm 
would occur at some unidentified future date, in an undetermined 
location, Justice Breyer argued, there should still be standing where 
there is a "realistic likelihoocf' that the plaintiff would suffer harm 
from the government's future conduct. 128 Under this rule, the 
plaintiffs would have standing as there was a "realistic likelihood" 
that one or more members of the plaintiff environmentalist 
organizations would suffer an injury from the future application of the 
Forest Service policy to various salvage projects throughout the 
national forests. As Justice Breyer explained, "a threat of future harm 
124 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150 (noting plaintiffs' "failure to allege that any particular 
timber sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a 
specific and concrete plan ... to enjoy the National Forests"). 
The plaintiffs did submit additional affidavits filed after the district court's decision. The 
Court did not consider whether these "late-filed" affidavits alleged facts sufficient to support 
standing as there was no rule or precedent to support the consideration of such material "after 
the trial is over, judgment has been entered, and a notice of appeal has been filed." Id. at 1153 
(emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1150 n. *. 
125 Summers, 129 S.Ct. at 1150. 
126 Id. at 1151. 
127 Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
128 ld. at 1155-56. 
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may be realistic even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, 
dates, and GPS coordinates."129 
Whatever the merits of Justice Breyer's preferred approach, it 
departs significantly from the standing for injury-in-fact articulated in 
Lujan and reiterated in cases since. The plaintiffs in Lujan were also 
environmentalist organizations with many members with an 
undisputed interest in the preservation of endangered species. As a 
consequence, there was a "reasonable likelihood" that one or more 
members of the plaintiff groups would have suffered a harm from the 
challenged policy in the future, insofar as it would have allowed the 
federal government to fund projects that could destroy endangered 
species habitat overseas. Yet the Lujan court required more. Harms 
that would occur "someday" in the future were not enough, however 
reasonably likely they might have been. In other words, under Lujan, 
plaintiffs were required to identify a time, date, or GPS coordinate 
where the harm would occur. To grant plaintiffs standing in Summers 
would have been to loosen the strictures adopted in Lujan. 
The Court narrowly rejected the standing of another interest group 
plaintiff in Rein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 130 
The Freedom from Religion Foundation ("FRF") alleged the 
Bush Administration's Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by 
hosting conferences at which speakers used excessively religious 
imagery and suggested that faith-based programs might be more 
effective at delivering social services than secular entities because of 
their religious orientation.131 
Substantively, FRF's claim was always a bit of a stretch under 
existing precedent132 The standing claim was not much stronger. As 
already noted, taxpayer standing is generally disfavored. A plaintiff's 
status as a taxpayer, without more, is ari insufficient basis for Article 
III standing. As the Court noted in Rein, "if every federal taxpayer 
could sue to challenge .any Government expenditure, the federal 
courts would cease to function as courts of law and would be cast in 
the role of general complaint bureaus."133 
FRF sought to avoid this general bar to taxpayer standing by 
relying upon Flast v. Cohen. 134 In Flast, the Supreme Court 
129 /d. at 1156. 
13o 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007). 
131 /d. at 2559. 
132 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REv. 115, 
116 (stating that case was a "lawsuit destined to go nowhere"). 
133 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559. 
134 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565. 
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recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against taxpayer 
standing for a subset of Establishment Clause cases. 135 Specifically, 
the Court allowed a taxpayer to challenge federal grants to religious 
schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
because "the Establishment Clause ... specifically limit[s] the taxing 
and spending power" under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.136 
The problem for FRF was that the Court had long construed the 
Flast exception in a stingy fashion. Flast was an anomaly in the 
jurisprudence of taxpayer standing that had "already been limited 
strictly to its facts" by 1983. 137 In nearly all of the Court's subsequent 
cases, the Court read Flast quite narrowly. 138 Unless a specific case 
rested on all fours with Flast, the Court was almost certain to reject 
taxpayer standing. 139 In order to demonstrate standing, taxpayers were 
required to establish a nexus between their status as taxpayers and the 
specific use of the Article I, Section 8 spending power through a 
specific legislative enactment. 140 As the Court explained in Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 141 Flast "limited taxpayer standing to 
challenges directed 'only [at] exercises of congressional power"' 
under the taxing and spending power. 142 Thus, the Court found 
taxpayer standing in Tilton v. Richardson143 and Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 144 but not in other post-Flast cases. 
This distinction between legislative and executive acts proved fatal 
to FRF' s claims. Because Congress never enacted legislation 
explicitly funding or approving the Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiative actions FRF sought to challenge, FRF could not 
avail itself of the Flast exception for._ taxpayer standing. In his opinion 
for the Court, Justice Alita repeatedly stressed that Flast had only 
concerned challenges of legislatively-authorized spending, and 
135 Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06. 
136fd. at 105. 
137 See Scalia, supra note 18, at 898. It is also worth noting that Flast was perhaps the last 
case to explicitly reject a separation-of-powers rationale for standing. See id. at 897 (citing 
Flast, 392 U.S. at 100-01). 
I3B See Lee Epstein eta!., supra note 43, at 664 (explaining that the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts have all narrowly construed Flast); see also Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling 
Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612,628 (2004) ("In the years following Flast, the Court embarked 
on a process of limiting the federal taxpayer standing doctrine."). 
139 Staudt, supra note 138, at 628-29 (discussing various decisions that narrowly construed 
Flast); see also Epstein eta!., supra note 43, at 664 ("Unless the dispute was a near-carbon copy 
of Flast, they almost never granted standing."). 
140 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620 (1988). 
141454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
142 /d. at 479 (alteration in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)). 
143 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
144 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
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declined FRF' s invitation to expand taxpayer standing for 
Establishment Clause challenges to discrete Executive Branch 
actions. Doing so, Justice Alita warned, would have authorized undue 
judicial intrusion into the workings of the Executive Branch. 145 
Commentators were quite critical of Hein. Some alleged the Court 
"overturned years of precedent" with its decision. 146 Anthony Lewis 
charged the Court "covertly overruled earlier decisions . . . 
recognizing the standing of members of the public to challenge 
measures that assist religious activities."147 Yet what is actually 
striking about Hein is how little it changed. Not only did the decision 
not overturn "years of precedent," it left standing the law of taxpayer 
standing in the Establishment Clause context, neither expanding nor 
contracting the Flast exception. 
This is not a defense of Hein. 148 The legislative-executive 
distinction is not particularly satisfying. Indeed, six of the nine 
Justices joined opinions explicitly rejecting it. The four dissenters 
were happy with Flast, if only it could be expanded. They preferred 
to allow taxpayer challenges to alleged establishments of religion, 
whether by legislative or executive act. 149 Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Thomas, concurred separately to call for overruling Flast 
entirely and eliminating all taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause 
cases.
150 
What these six justices had in common was a belief that the 
Flast-Hein distinction between legislative and other governmental 
acts is unprincipled and unsustainable. 
While Justice Alita's opinion for the Court sought to closely track 
the contours of Flast as interpreted and applied in subsequent cases, it 
stopped short of defending the actual decision or its initial rationale. 
To the contrary, the Alita opinion criticized Flast for giving too little 
attention to separation of powers concems.151 Of those Justices in the 
majority, only one-Justice Kennedy-was willing to say Flast was 
14
5 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found. Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2569-70 (2007). Justice 
Kennedy adopts this same argument in his concurrence. Id. at 2573 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
146 See Stephanie Mencimer, Supreme Court: Taking Care of Business, MOTHER 
JONES, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.motheijones.com/politics/2008/0l/supreme-court-taking-care-
business. 
147 Anthony Lewis, The Court: How 'So Few Have So Quickly Changed So Much,' 1HE 
N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2007, .1!!; 58, 59. 
148 For a brief argument that the separation of powers concerns identified by Justice 
Kennedy provide a stronger argument for standing in Hein than in Massachusetts, see Jonathan 
H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of 
Powers after Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REv. 175 (2008). 
149 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584-86 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
150 See id. at 2573-74 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
151 I d. at 2569 (plurality opinion). 
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"correct" and should be neither "called into question" nor expanded 
to cover additional circumstances .152 
However unsatisfying Hein's resolution of the underlying standing 
claim may be, it did not constrict taxpayer standing. To the contrary, 
He in explicitly left the law of taxpayer standing where it stood before 
the case was heard. However stingy the Court's interpretation of Flast 
was in Hein, this was not the first case to confine Flast to legislative 
exercises of the taxing and spending power, and, if the Court's 
composition remains stable (and Justice Kennedy does not change his 
mind), it may not be the last. 
If He in narrowly denied FRF' s standing, leaving the law of 
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases in place, Sprint 
Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. resolved an even more 
narrow question of first impression in favor of the party asserting 
standing. 153 Sprint Communications arose out of disputes between 
payphone operators and long-distance carriers over compensation that 
the latter owes the former for "dial-around" calls. 154 Under the federal 
Communications Act, long-distance carriers are obligated to 
compensate payphone operators for such calls. 155 If the compensation 
is not paid, payphone operators may sue long-distance carriers for the 
money owed. 156 Because litigation is expensive, payphone operators 
may assign their claims to "aggregators" who pursue the claims on 
their behalf, economizing on litigation costs by pursuing multiple 
claims simultaneously. In Sprint Communications, the question 
before the Court was whether an aggregator, APCC Services, could 
have standing to pursue dial-around call compensation claims even if 
the aggregator retained no financial interest in the litigation.157 
The Court held 5-4 that an aggregator' s lack of a direct stake in 
the outcome of the litigation did not preclude standing. 158 Justice 
Stephen Breyer explained for the majority that "history and precedent 
make clear that such an assignee has long been permitted to bring 
suit," even if no prior case had so held. 159 Just because the 
aggregators file suit in their own name, and retain no stake in the 
15>Jd. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
153 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2533 (2008). 
154 
"Dial-around" calls occur when a customer uses an access code or toll-free number to 
directly access the long-distance communications carrier to bypass the payphone operator when 
making a long-distance call from a payphone. !d. at 2534. 
155 See 47 U.S.C. § 226 (2000); 47 C.P.R. § 64.1300 (2008). 
156 See Global Crossing Telecornrn., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecornrn., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513, 
1516 (2007). 
157 Sprint Commc'ns, 128 S. Ct. at 2533. 
158Jd. 
159Jd. 
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outcome of the litigation,160 the majority saw no reason to strictly 
enforce the traditional bar against asserting a third-party's claims, 
particularly given the long-standing history of recognizing suits by 
assignees in other contexts, such as in qui tam litigation.161 The 
majority further rejected the idea that firms had to use other means of 
aggregating claims-such as class actions-if the aggregation of 
assignments, as done by APCC Services, would be more efficient at 
resolving the payphone operators' claims.162 
The dissent, on the other hand, could find no case in which 
equivalent claims had been allowed to proceed, and saw no reason to 
open the courthouse door any further, even if only by an inch. Both 
history and common sense confirmed "[t]here is a legal difference 
between something and nothing," Chief Justice Roberts wrote in 
dissent. So long as the aggregators "have nothing to gain from their 
lawsuit," he continued, they lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of 
federal courts. 163 Allowing relators or others to pursue claims in 
which they retain an interest, or for which they could receive a 
bounty, is one thing. Pursuit of a naked claim is something else. As 
Chief Justice Roberts explained, "An assignee who has acquired the 
bare legal right to prosecute a claim but no right to the substantive 
recovery cannot show that he has a personal stake in the litigation."164 
The dueling opinions devoted extensive space-nearly fifty 
pages-to their respective positions. In the process the two opinions 
skirmished over obscure historical precedents and the meaning of a 
decades-old student note,165 all to decide a rather narrow (and 
potentially insignificant) question of standing law that had not arisen 
before. Both majority and dissent agreed that "as a practical matter" a 
denial of standing could have been easily overcome, perhaps with 
payment of nominal reward for a successful suit.166 If, as the majority 
claimed, standing could be assured with payment of "only a dollar or 
160 Under the arrangements at issue the aggregators would receive a set fee for pursuing the 
claims, and reassign any successful claims back to the payphone operators. ld. at 2534. 
161 !d. at 2542. 
162 /d. at 2544. 
163 !d. at 2549 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
164 !d. at 2550. 
165 Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. REs. 
L. REV. 1023, at 1039-1041 (2009). The student note at issue was Comment, The Real Party in 
Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper 
Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL. L.REv. 1452 (1967). See Sprint Cornmc'ns, 128 S.Ct. at 2540 
(majority opinion) (discussing note); id. at 2556 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (same). 
166 Sprint Commc'ns, 128 S. Ct. at 2544 (majority opinion); id. at 2553 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). · 
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two,"167 the dissent was willing to assert "Article Ill is worth a 
dollar."168 
In retrospect, the case may have been about even less than the 
Justices surmised. While the majority may have thought it was 
making it easier to vindicate assigned rights and adopt a lower-cost 
means of pursuing dial-around compensation claims, it now appears 
the holding may have been completely unnecessary·. Back in the 
lower courts, the arrangement suddenly be.came moot. In subsequent 
proceedings before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
APCC claimed a sufficient interest in its assigned claims to satisfy the 
dissenters' standing requirements, despite its prior protestations to the 
contrary. 169 After the Supreme Court's decision in Sprint 
Communications, APCC revealed that "in fact it does keep some, 
perhaps a substantial portion, of funds awarded for payphone 
compensation," despite its prior claims to the contrary. 170 Had this 
been APCC' s position from the start, there would have been no 
question of its standing, and years of litigation could have been 
avoided. Thus, Sprint Communications may turn out to be a 
completely inconsequential case-at least for the specific dispute at 
issue. If the decision has any effect, however, it will be to lower the 
hurdles faced by litigants asserting Article Ill standing, even if only 
on the margin. 
CONCLUSION 
Any attempt to reach a definitive judgment about the Robe1ts 
Court at this early date is a perilous exercise. The Roberts Court is 
still a work in progress-a work that is likely to see significant 
change in the years ahead, with or without a change in the Court's 
composition. In an effort to forecast such changes, commentators and 
academics rush to identify the Court's early inclinations and foretell 
the likely road ahead. The temptation to offer tentative conclusions 
can be irresistible-a temptation to which this author and the other 
participants to this Symposium have succumbed. 
Many commentators assert that the Roberts Court limited citizen 
access to federal courts in its frrst four terms. In some areas this may 
be true. In the case of Article Ill standing, however, it is not. Given 
Chief Justice Roberts's prior writing, and demonstrated interest in 
167 Id. at 2544 (majority opiruon). 
16B I d. at 2553 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
169 See NetworkiP, LLC v. Fed. Comrnc'ns Comrn'n, 548 F.3d 116, 120 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
170 I d.; see also id. at 129 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (expressing "dismay" at APCC's 
"bizarre conduct" and "sudden reversal" in position). 
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standing, one may expect federal jurisdiction to contract. Yet, as this 
Article has sought to show, if there has been any change in standing 
law on Chief Justice Roberts's watch, it has been in the 
opposite direction. If anything, the Roberts Court has expanded the 
realm of justiciable claims under Article III, the Chief Justice's 
opposition notwithstanding. In this respect, at least, the Roberts Court 
has increased access to the federal courts. 
